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STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

The trial court concluded the sale did not include the business.

On page 2 of their brief, Plaintiffs take issue with Moyle's statement, made on
pages 9-10 of his brief, that the court concluded that the sale did not include the business.
Plaintiffs admit that the sale was only for real estate and certain personal property, but
argue that this "does constitute the business." This claim is not supported by the record.
A review of the entire record shows that the primary issue in this case was whether the
sale included the business as such, and the trial court consistently held the sale did not
include the business.
The issue of whether the contract contemplated the sale of the business as a going
concern, as contrasted with the sale of some but not all of the business assets, was raised

numerous times throughout the trial. Each time the trial court ruled that the sale was
limited to the specific assets listed on the contract, and that it did not include the business
as such. For example, on pages 30-36, the court ruled on what was sold by the contract.
The court opened the discussion by stating the court's initial impression of what was sold:
[Court] But you need to know, I guess, what it is I think was
sold here. And just looking at the contract what I think was
sold was the real estate, the guest book, and the name. And
I think probably the phone list[ing], I don't know. Probably
not, but I don't know.
(Tr. 34.)
Mr. Russell then argued that the contract contemplated the sale of the business.
(Tr. 34-35.) The following exchange then occurred:
THE COURT: Well, you need to be careful, Mr. Russell,
you'll fall right into Mr. Slaugh's hands because what he
argued in summary judgment is is [sic] that this contract
originally contemplated the sale of a bunch of personal
property, equipment that had been used in the business and by
excluding that he was amending, really rejecting the offer and
making a counter offer. So, how far are you going on that?
MR. RUSSELL: Well, I recall that discussion.
THE COURT: It was pretty critical to my decision. So how
far are you going?
(Tr. 35.)
The court then concluded:
THE COURT: Let me tell you what I interpret from the
contract. If that's all I have is the contract, the real estate is
included, these prepayment, these prepaid nightly rentals,
obviously that's fair because they are going to have to provide
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a room for these people who have prepaid, the guest book,
and the right to use the name because the name is stated
Canyon Country Bed and Breakfast is statedrightthere on the
agreement, but not anything else.
(Tr. 35.)
Later, Mr. Day gave an opinion that the value of a complete bed and breakfast
business was $250,000. (Tr. 49-51.) Moyle moved to strike the testimony "on the
ground that the listing value he gave was for something different than what the court had
[held was] sold." Alternatively, Moyle moved to reopen the summary judgment ruling
on the same grounds. (Tr. 52.) The exchange which followed between the trial court
and plaintiffs' counsel illustrates that the trial court concluded that the sale did not include
the business:
THE COURT: Well, I'll see where Mr. Russell gets with his
redirect. He [Moyle's counsel] makes the point that this is an
expression of opinion for everything.
MR. RUSSELL: I'm sorry, Your Honor.
THE COURT: This is an opinion as to the value of a turn key
business.
MR. RUSSELL: Right.
THE COURT: Okay. And I have said that what they bought
was the real estate with improvements thereupon that [sic]
specifically identified personal property, the guest book and
the name.
(R. 52-53.)
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Perhaps most telling is the court's ultimate ruling. Notwithstanding Moyle's
objections, the court eventually received the testimony of Mr. Day that the value of the
turnkey business was $250,000. The court then reduced that value by $15,000 to
compensate for the fact that Copelands did not buy the telephone number and listing (R.
99-100.) There would have been no reason for this reduction if Copelands had purchased
the entire business. The fact that the court made the reduction shows conclusively that
the trial court held that Copelands did not contract to purchase the business.
B.

Plaintiffs were not prevented from obtaining an appraisal.
On page 10 of their brief, plaintiffs claim that Mr. Moyle had refused to allow an

appraisal of his property, and apparently assert that as partial excuse for the failure to
present competent appraisal testimony at trial. The record does not support the claim that
plaintiffs were prevented from obtaining an appraisal. The Affidavit of Joe Kingsley,
included in the appendix to appellees' brief, asserts in paragraph 9 that Mr. Moyle
initially refused access to the property to Copelands and Mr. Kingsley. Paragraph 10 of
the same affidavit, however, states: "On August 14, 1997, I and the other agents from
my office were allowed access to the property for the first time since the date of the sales
transaction." The affidavit goes on to describe what was observed during that inspection
and shows that the inspection was quite detailed. (R. 111.) Kingsley's affidavit,
therefore, shows that plaintiffs were allowed access to the property. There is no contrary
evidence.
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Plaintiffs' own evidence shows that plaintiffs were granted full access to the
property. Even if plaintiffs had been denied access, however, it would have been very
simple to file a request under Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to allow an
appraiser to inspect the property. No such request was filed. Plaintiffs' claim that they
were denied access to the property is not accurate.

C.

There was no evidence that the business was not viable at the time of sale.
Plaintiffs' brief states: "Defendant, without offering any support, took the position

that the phone line for his bed and breakfast business, non-existent at the time of sale,
was its most important asset." (Brief of Appellee at 15.) This statement is ambiguous,
and could mean either that the phone line was non-existent at the time of sale or that the
business was non-existent. Either construction, however, is contrary to the evidence.
There was no question that the telephone lines were present at the time of sale. (Tr. 8687.) The possible claim that there was no business apparently refers to the argument
made on pages 7-8 of plaintiffs' brief. Plaintiffs there argue that the only "business" was
the assets, and that there was no business separate from the assets. The fallacy of this
factual assertion is addressed above at pages 1-3.
The quoted sentence from plaintiffs' brief also asserts that there was no support
for Mr. Moyle's testimony that the telephone line and number was one of the most
important assets of the business. The testimony was well supported by logic and Mr.
Moyle's experience running the business. Mr. Moyle testified:
5

Q

How critical is a phone to a bed and breakfast?

A
Well, if the phone doesn't ring you don't have any
business. You are just a house. Basically, people that [are]
booked, they are not people casually driving into town, they
are people that get the phone number out of some kind of ad
somewhere, across the country, around the world, and they
book in advance to stay there. It isn't a business without the
phone lines. You have just got a house with furniture in my
opinion.
Q
When do you place the advertisements, what part of the
year?
A
They come annually, usually. You renew it with, I
guess it's Triple A and there are other organizations, Utah
Travel Council, but they have publications once a year that
goes out and pretty much that's when the phone rings that's
who your income is right there. It's not like you are out on
the street with the sign dragging people in. It's got your best
breakfast. They already have reservations by the time they
get to Moab and I think everybody in this courtroom probably
knows that.
(Tr. 81-82.) This testimony fully supports Mr. Moyle's contention that the telephone line
was very critical to the business, and that the trial court's arbitrary $15,000 value for the
telephone lines and advertising was not supported by the evidence.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PROVE A PRIMA FACIE CASE;
THE REMEDY IS DISMISSAL, NOT REMAND.
Point I of Moyle's brief established that Copelands failed to present competent
evidence of the value of the assets described in the real estate purchase contract. Moyle
supported this argument by citation to several cases.

Copelands' response to this

argument, on pages 15-16 of appellee's brief, does not attempt to distinguish any of the
cases cited by Moyle. Copelands' response instead appears to focus on three arguments:
(1) that Moyle had some burden to produce evidence to rebut the testimony of Randy
Day, (2) that the $15,000 reduction was a fair estimate of the value of the telephone
listing and telephone system, and (3) the remedy if there was an error is to remand for
additional evidence on value. These arguments will be addressed in order.
Moyle had no burden to produce evidence of the value of the assets described in
the real estate purchase contract.1 This is not a case were the plaintiffs had produced
competent evidence of value, sufficient to shift to the defendant the burden of proving a
different value or an alternative theory of value, such as occurred in Ault v. Dubois. 739
P.2d 1117, 1120-21 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Rather, plaintiffs here failed to present a
prima facie case of damages. Where plaintiffs failed to present a prima facie case, Moyle

*Moyle did testify that $250,000 was too high a value for the property, and that a fair
value was $185,000. (Tr. 85, 89.)
7

had no obligation to present evidence to rebut Mr. Day's testimony. This principle is
established by the several cases cited by Moyle, and which were not rebutted by
Copelands.
The second argument made by Copelands is that the $15,000 reduction was a fair
estimate of the value of the telephone listing and the advertisements already in place
referring to that telephone number. Copelands support this argument by citing to the
comments of the trial judge, but fail to identify any evidence supporting those comments.
Mr. Moyle had testified that the telephone line and the existing advertisements linked to
that telephone number were among the most important assets of the bed and breakfast
business, and further explained that the advertising publications come out once a year.2
(Tr. 81-90.) Mr. Moyle further testified that he had retained the telephone line and
number and was using it in his existing travel agency business. The trial court responded
to this testimony by agreeing that "it is important to the continuity of the business that the
existing advertising correctly identify the phone number and so I think not having the
phone line may and does affect the price, the value of the property." (Tr. 99.) The trial
court stated, however, that "I am hard pressed to believe that Mr. Moyle would have

2

The timing of the advertising was critical because Copelands contracted to purchase
the property after the advertisements had already been issued for the year. (Tr. 55.)
Copelands claimed on the bottom of page 7 of their brief that "all the Copelands had to
do to "to be in business" was open the doors and do a little advertising." Because the
trade publications had already been issued for the year, however, it would have been very
difficult for Copelands to do any effective advertising that year.
8

gained anything by keeping the number with nothing more than Rocky Mountain Tours
with one tour in two summers." (Tr. 99.)
The comments of the trial court reveal that the trial court focused on the wrong
issue. The issue was not what Mr. Moyle gained by retaining the telephone system.
Rather, the issue was what the bed and breakfast business would have lost by not having
the existing telephone number linked to advertisements already in place. More importantly, no evidence was presented on either issue at trial. Although a fact finder is
free to accept or reject evidence of value, the fact finder cannot manufacture a value
where no evidence is given. In Sawyers v. FMA Leasing Co.. 722 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah
1986), the court held that "proof of lost gross profits does not afford courts a proper basis
for a damage award, where there is no evidentiary basis on which to calculate net profits
with reasonable certainty." The gross profit figure in Sawyers is analogous to the value
given by Mr. Day for a complete bed and breakfast business. Just as the Sawyers court
could not infer a level of net profits from evidence of gross profits, the court here could
not infer the value of real estate and certain personal property where the only evidence
was of a complete turnkey business.
Finally, Copelands argue that tf[s]hould this Appellate Court be troubled by the
reduction, it should affirm the court's conclusion that Randy Day's testimony provided
a sufficient basis for a valuation of $250,000, and remand solely for the determination
of the value of the phone line." (Appellees' brief at 16.) Copelands cite no authority for
this proposal. Several decisions of the appellate courts confirm that where a party fails
9

to establish a necessary element of the party's case, such as failing to prove damages, the
appropriate remedy is to dismiss the case. In Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States
Telephone and Telegraph Co., 709 P.2d 330 (Utah 1985), the court held that proof of
damages entailed proof of two points: the fact of damages, and the amount of damages.
709 P.2d at 336. In that case, the plaintiff had only provided proof of loss of gross
income, but the jury made an award of damages. On appeal, the court held that the proof
of loss of gross income only was insufficient to support the damage award. IcL The
court did not remand the case for additional evidence, but reversed the case outright. 709
P.2d at 337.
This rule was confirmed in Sawyers v. FMA Leasing Company. 722 P.2d 773
(Utah 1986). The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' case because they
had presented evidence of gross profit losses only, and thus had not presented any
evidence from which the trial court could reasonably have calculated the damages. 722
P.2d at 775. Other cases supporting this concept include Bass v. Planned Management
Services, Inc., 761 P.2d 566, 568-69 (Utah 1988) (claim for slander of title reversed
where plaintiff failed to provide adequate proof of special damages); Paul Mueller Co.
v. Cache Valley Dairy Association. 657 P.2d 1279 (Utah 1982) (plaintiffs failed to state
a claim where they failed to prove actual loss to business from defective equipment).3

3

In Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597 (1962), the Supreme Court did
remand for additional evidence on the amount of damages. That case is distinguishable
because the plaintiff there had presented admissible expert testimony on the market value
of the property. 368 Utah 2d at 89, 368 P.2d at 601. The case did not, therefore,
10

In order to state a claim, Copelands were required to present competent evidence
of the value of the real estate and personal property described in the real estate purchase
contract. Copelands presented no evidence of that value. Although Copelands did
attempt to prove the value of a turnkey bed and breakfast, that was not what was
described in the contract. There was no evidence from which the trial court could
determine the value of the assets described in the contract. Copelands failed to present
a prima facie case, and their case must be dismissed.
POINT H
RANDY DAY'S TESTIMONY OF VALUE WAS
PROHIBITED BY STATUTE.
Moyle's initial brief acknowledged the general rule that a trial court generally has
discretion to determine the qualifications of a proposed expert witness. (Moyle's brief
at 21.) But for the provisions of the Utah Real Estate Appraiser Registration and
Certification Act, it is possible that Moyle would have agreed that Randy Day was
competent to testify concerning value.4 Regardless of Mr. Day's actual qualifications,
that Act prohibited him from testifying because he was not a licensed appraiser.

present a situation where the plaintiff had wholly failed to present admissible proof of
damages. Rather, the trial court had made an incorrect decision based on the evidence
presented.
Additional reasons why Mr. Day's testimony should have been excluded include that
he only testified concerning a fair listing price for the business and he failed to testify
concerning the value of the specific assets included in the real estate purchase contract.
11

Copelands claim that case of State ex rel. G.Y. (C.Y. v. State). 962 P.2d 78 (Utah
Ct. App. 1998), holds that a professional does not need state licensing to qualify as an
expert witness. The appellant in that case argued that a psychologist was not competent
to testify in a parental termination case because a court rule regarding custody valuations
required that psychological evaluations be performed by licensed psychologists. The
appellate court held that the custody evaluation rule did not apply in a termination case.
962 P.2d at 82. The court then held that because the statute did not apply, the trial court
had discretion to determine whether the professional was competent to testify. The court
specifically did not decide the issue present in this case, whether a person statutorily
prohibited from testifying may nonetheless testify as an expert witness.
Copelands argue that the appraiser act does not apply here because it only prohibits
unlicensed persons from giving an appraisal report "for valuable consideration." A
review of the record shows that Mr. Day gave his opinion for valuable consideration.
He acknowledged that he had his "own interest at stake" in making the valuation. Mr.
Day testified that the reason he evaluated5 the property was to determine whether to list
the property for Mr. Moyle. (Transcript 39-40.) Mr. Day is a party to this action
because he listed the property for a valuable consideration. As explained on pages 19

5

Mr. Day did not actually do anything to evaluate the property's value. Mr. Day
admitted that he did not even perform a comparable market analysis, although that is the
typical practice. He explained that he and other real estate agents generally will "try to
get what we call a market analysis on a property . . . and we do that by comparables,
other sales that have already happened and closed within a reasonable amount: of time."
(Tr. 37.) He admitted he "did not do that on this property." (Tr. 38; see also Tr. 43.)
12

through 21 of Moyle's initial brief, the tenor of Mr. Day's testimony was to relate the
evaluation process he went through in determining whether to list the property. He made
his evaluation of the property as part of the listing process, for a valuable consideration.
His testimony was, therefore, prohibited by the statute.
POINT in

THE "ACCEPTANCE" WAS A COUNTEROFFER.
The trial court struggled at the hearing on summary judgment and again throughout
trial with the question of whether the real estate purchase contract provided for the sale
of the business or just certain specified assets (which were necessarily less than the
business). Moyle initially argued, at the summary judgment hearing, that the contract
contemplated the sale of the business and that his exclusion of certain personal property
used in the business converted his "acceptance" into a counteroffer. The court ruled
otherwise, and held that the contract did not extend to the entire business.
In order to be consistent with the trial court's ruling on summary judgment, Moyle
was required to change from his initial position. Moyle therefore consistently asserted
at trial that the real estate purchase contract did not provide for the sale of the business.
Copelands, however, frequently asserted at trial, and have asserted in their brief, that the
sale was for the entire business. There is language in the real estate purchase contract
to support that argument. The contract offers to purchase "Bed & Breakfast at 590 N 500
W Moab." The contract included "all furnishings." The drafters of the contract deemed
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it necessary to exclude "ski boots," apparently believing the ski boots otherwise would
have been included in the sale. The contract is arguably ambiguous as to whether it
contemplated the sale of the entire business.
Moyle's exclusion of additional business assets, of the same character as the "ski
boots" already specifically excluded, constituted a counteroffer.

It is irrelevant that

Moyle was a real estate agent and should have known better than to check "acceptance."
The case cited by Moyle in his initial brief, Benya v. Stevens and Thompson Paper Co.,
468 A.2d 929 (Vt. 1983), involved an attorney who purported to accept an offer but
actually made a counteroffer. Both attorneys and real estate agents sometimes fail to act
in a manner consistent with their training. The issue in this case is thus not what Moyle
should have done, but what interpretation the law places on his actions. Moyle changed
the offer to expand the scope of an existing exclusion in the contract, and to thereby
exclude additional assets used in the business which were a source of revenue for the
business. He also modified the contract to disclose that he was a licensed real estate
agent,6 which might have also given Copelands a reason to not accept his counteroffer.
Even though he labeled the document has an "acceptance," the law treats such a
modified "acceptance" as a counteroffer. The counteroffer was not accepted in writing
prior to the time it was withdrawn. There was, therefore, no binding contract between
the parties.

6

As required by Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-11(11) (Supp. 1999).
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POINT IV
THE PREJUDGMENT AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES
WAS IMPROPER.
Moyle's initial brief showed that trial court erred in entering judgment for attorney
fees supposedly based on the default judgment, but after the default judgment was set
aside. In response, plaintiffs claim that fees were recoverable in any event because the
real estate purchase contract provides that the prevailing party shall be awarded a
reasonable attorney fee. This argument does not address the concerns raised by Moyle.
There are at least two errors in the January 29, 1999, judgment for attorney fees.
First, at the time the January 29, 1999, judgment was entered, there was no determination
that plaintiffs were the prevailing party. Second, even if the claim for attorney fees had
been made at the conclusion of trial, after the trial court had determined that plaintiffs
with prevailing party, it would have been error to award all the fees claimed. Moyle
explained in his initial brief that most of the fees claimed related to the default judgment
which was improperly obtained and ultimately set aside.

Moyle further cited to

controlling case authority holding that the prevailing party is entitled only to fees for the
issues on which that party prevailed. Plaintiffs did not respond to this argument or case
authority.
This court should reverse the judgment for attorney fees made January 29, 1999.
In the event this court affirms the entitlement to attorney fees, the matter should still be
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remanded to determine a reasonable attorney fee for the work to that point on which
plaintiffs prevailed.
POINT V
JUDGMENT INTEREST SHOULD NOT BE COMPOUNDED.
Plaintiffs concede that the interest rate on the judgments should shift in accordance
with the statutory rate change each year. Plaintiffs go on to claim, howevei', that "at
each calendar year end, the Judgment must be increased by the amount of interest earned
the previous year under the prior rate.11 (Appellees' brief at 17.) Plaintiffs did not
support this argument by citation to any authority. Compound interest is disfavored
unless clearly mandated by statute or contract. Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v.
Neale. 783 P.2d 551, 555 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). There is no contract which provides
for interest in this case. The post-judgment interest statute, Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4
(1999), does not provide for compound interest. Accord Estate Landscape and Snow
Removal Specialists. Inc. v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co.. 793 P.2d
415, 420 (Ct. App. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 844 P.2d 322 (Utah 1992).
Nothing in the judgment at issue here provides for compound interest, so the issue
is not technically ripe for decision by this court. Moyle has addressed the issue out of
an abundance of caution, to preserve the argument in the event plaintiffs later claim they
are entitled to compound interest.
CONCLUSION
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Copelands failed to prove the value of the assets described in the real estate
purchase contract, and thus failed to prove a prima facie case. No evidence was
presented at trial on the value of the real estate and personal property described in the
contract. The only evidence presented by Copelands was of the value of a complete
business, but the trial court held that Copelands did not contract to purchase a complete
business. Because Copelands failed to prove a prima facie case, their case must be
dismissed.
In any event, because there was at least an argument that the contract was to
include the entire business, Moyle's exclusion of additional business assets was a material
change to his "acceptance." Moyle's "acceptance" thereby became a counteroffer.
Plaintiffs did not accept the counteroffer before it was withdrawn.

There was no

contract, and the entire case must be dismissed.
DATED this 3*^ day of January, 2000.

LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: £)
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
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